Price Sent Home - Blunt

My view of the scenario was that this would be an updated battle of the Alamo. I had assumed that Price, (Neal), knew our supply depot was at the Baro farm and he would send his entire force there as rapidly as possible to destroy it. My only hope was that he did not know the strength of the defending force and would proceed cautiously. This would give Gen. Herron's, (Niall, Digby & Mitra), relief column time to reach me. I had estimated that it would take the head of his column 30-45 minutes to arrive by the most direct route.

Given the dire situation, I decided to mount an aggressive forward defense with Wickersham's, (1. Balwin, 2.Martin), cavalry. I thought that if we could force the rebs to deploy out of Uniontown and gradually fall back to the J. Christ farm we could buy enough time to allow Herron to appear. I felt our best case outcome would be steadily falling back to just in front of the Baro farm with Herron arriving at the critical moment.

To my dismay, the rebel cavalry advanced towards the Christ farm only 10 minutes into the scenario. I felt certain that their infantry would be close behind. It was a small force, only two regiments, so I ordered our cavalry to dispatch them quickly. I wanted to get them on the hill NW of Uniontown to delay that enemy column of infantry. Both Balwin and later Martin did this with great efficiency. Imagine my surprise when Wickersham reached that hill and reported that he could see no more enemy.

I ordered him to proceed through town, as they must surely be close by. I kept looking to the NE for Herron's flags and dreading that I might see those of Price coming up the Meadow Branch Road. Around 40 minutes into the scenario, I sent a courier off to Herron, asking his location. The reply I received, shocked me. He was at the J. Crouse farm. That wasn't on the route I had expected him to take. I thought he was on a sightseeing tour of the countryside.

At that same moment, I heard artillery fire to the north and received a message from Wickersham that there was no enemy infantry anywhere in sight east of town. At that moment, for the first time, I finally had a clear picture of the tactical situation. The rebels had gone up the Plank Road to intercept the relief column. Gen. Herron had wisely anticipated this event and was taking a circuitous route to avoid the enemy and bring his command to me intact.

I was not worried as to the outcome of the fight I was hearing. The rebels could not possibly have their entire force that far NE and fully deployed. No doubt only a fraction of the enemy was on the field. Although I had no idea as to the strength or composition of the relief force, I was certain that it would be able to quickly deal with a brigade or two. I recalled Wickersham and awaited news from Herron.

It was not long in coming. He reported he had had a slight delay while pushing aside a small rebel force. Minutes later, Bredett's, (Mitra), cavalry rode up to the Baro farm asking for orders. Wickersham's cavalry began to arrive at this time also. I was wishing for infantry, but felt at this point I could slow any enemy attack until Herron's main force arrived. Also at this time I received news that Col. Huston's hemorrhoids were acting up and would be unable to lead his men. Possibly true, though more likely he stumbled upon a still belonging to Crouse, a notorious moonshiner, and settled himself beneath a juniper tree with a jug. I gave orders to his subordinate, Dye, to move to the Baro farm, which he did. Only his regiments did not, they were all TC'd!

Herron was at the depot only for a few minutes when the enemy began arriving along the Meadow Branch road from the SE. This was very satisfactory to me as most of our strength was SE of the Baro farm. I felt that the enemy would be at a serious disadvantage deploying out of that valley and advancing up the ridge to my waiting forces. What did surprised me was the sheer number of enemy Price brought with him.

As I was riding up and down the line serenely watching the enemy's destruction, I noticed that on my extreme left where I posted Huston's division, his artillery was unlimbering. I was not overly worried as I thought Dye had his brigade in support. I rode over to see what was bothering the artillery when I discovered Dye had neglected to bring his men with him. Worse, a large enemy brigade was coming up the hill and beginning to deploy along with a battery. The situation was not so serene now.

I ordered Dye to get his men up here immediately. Fortunately, the enemy brigade ignored the lone battery and turned their flank to it in order to attack the left of Herron's line. Within 5 minutes, two of the enemy regiments were in tatters as a result of the artillery's enfilade fire. One ball must have mowed down 30 men. That brigade took a horrible pounding and quickly lost effectiveness.

Just as Dye's men started to appear and I began to return to my buddha-esque serenity, an enemy cavalry brigade deployed to the immediate front of the artillery. I quickly sent a note to Wickersham to bring part of his cavalry to our left to help deal with this new threat as he had reported that all was quiet on the extreme right. He quickly complied. The cavalry arrived along with another battery. Just as I sent an order to Wickersham to attack that cavalry, they turned around and moved back to the right of the line. Worse still, that enemy brigade that my guns had savaged, returned, this time to give them their full attention. Wickersham reported that a fresh division had just shown up on the right, while Bredett reported that he was having trouble holding the center against large numbers of enemy. How many men did Price have anyway? I quickly told Bredett to cooperate with Wickersham in holding the line. I also sent an order to Col. Cloud, (Liitle Mac in 1st game), whose brigade had been with me since the beginning of the day and over on our right, to hold to the last man. I sent special instructions to the Indian Home Guard to attack with vigor and take no prisoners. This last encouragement was wholly unnecessary, but I wanted it to be known that the usual barbarities they visit upon anyone unfortunate enough to fall into their grasp would be overlooked. The situation was becoming desperate.

The fight for Huston's battery was close and vicious with considerable hand to hand fighting. But Dye's three regiments along with the two batteries on hand were able to drive off both the enemy cavalry and infantry. When I was satisfied there would be no credible threat on that end of the line, I hurried over to the right. But by this time, the line had stabilized and the enemy was in flight, pursued by our cavalry.

As I rode back to the center to visit with Gen. Herron, I passed through a part of the line that must have been held by the Indian Home guard. What I viewed was unspeakable and attested to the savagery with which this entire battle was fought.

I'd like to thank Martin for taking the time to put together a very good scenario. It has a number of tactical problems that are not easily solved. With a few different decisions, it's outcome would have been completely different. It would definitely be worthwhile to replay with new commanders.

Thanks for the great AAR. It really captures the desperate lack-of-knowledge that is an intrinsic part of KS / HITS, and the whole reason I enjoy this form of play so much.

Shame I couldn't make this one, but it sounds like it may be rerun with new commanders, so hopefully I'll get another chance!

Not a lot to add to the splendid AAR's from my perspective. After a great deal of marching and counter-marching, my division of proud Arkansan infantry and guns found itself in the great Meadow on Gen. Price's left. Peering up into the woods, all that could be seen was a couple of scattered regiments of dismounted Yankee cavalry, for which my boys had nothing but contempt. I decided to shake out my nearest brigade and have a go at the Yankee vermin. Pushing up the wooded slope, we met with good success and drove the blue-bellies before us. Well, if one brigade does some good, two brigades ought to do a lot of good, I thought -- and brought my second brigade up on the left, looking to do even more damage and turn the Yankee right. That's where things commenced to go south, so to speak, and not in a good way. More Yankee cavalry began appearing, thick as fleas they were, and the sheer numbers caused my boys to become fretful and squirrelly. Close-in woods fighting is not the ideal situation to attempt an extraction, and things went from medanary to poor in short order. At the end of all that, it is sad to report, it was every man for himself, trying to avoid the cowardly Yankee horsemen looking to run us to ground. Fortunately, these scoundrels failed in their attempt to completely block our escape to the north and northeast.

Personally, I think Gen. Price's plan was very appropriate to the situation. The only problem was in how it meshed -- or didn't -- with the schemes of that slime-ball, Yankee cavorter, Blunt. He hasn't seen the last of us, you can be dang sure.

Arkansas Forever!
Respectfully,
Gen. Francis Shoup
CSA

Uncle Billy - Huston's battery would be Capt Murphy's. I'd be interested to know what score he notched up by the end as he took 118 of Sven's men out in the first skirmish - an affair of perhaps only 5 or 10 minutes.

Mr. Digby wrote:Uncle Billy - Huston's battery would be Capt Murphy's. I'd be interested to know what score he notched up by the end as he took 118 of Sven's men out in the first skirmish - an affair of perhaps only 5 or 10 minutes.

Sorry for the delay, I had to run the replay again. Murphy's battery did well, 479 points.

Can someone post up the replay file please? I'd love to watch it.