SOWWL KS----Waterloo Historical Battle---Half Scale---- 1:7 Sprite Ratio

With the release of the NSD mapping tools I am finally able to start bringing historical battles to KS at a scale where the entire battle can be played on a single map in a single session and most importantly to make them run as smoothly as possible.

The first battle I am constructing is Waterloo because a lot of the work was already done by NorbSoft with the terrain and topography maps completed the only thing needed then was to scale everything down. The current version I am working on is approximately half scale to the original map consequentially large swaths of the battlefield can be viewed at the default view limit making a battle this large more realistically playable in HITS, at small player counts, and makes it quite immersive.

-The map scale is roughly half therefore the unit scale I am using is also half.
-Target battle time for this battle and most battles made after this is 90 minutes.
Reasoning is battle is roughly 9.5 hours long, map and unit size is cut in half, and the KS according to its developers plays out at about three times the historical speed.
9.5/2/3=1.583 hours
Translates into One real time minute = 6.33 game accelerated time minutes.
If you see any obvious flaws in the math or want to suggest some thing else feel free to comment.

Screen shots battlefield so far

https://gyazo.com/8e923cc2c6919d930daed533d4393e54
https://gyazo.com/1d66771a89e8cd774e9385bbaafa6f10
https://gyazo.com/67b0415b200fcfbffc2b94353c3a3c5c
https://gyazo.com/aed4677c24641ac14df57b3223cff8b2
https://gyazo.com/4e4d563d90ccf7d3d6ef06f20f8de20e
https://gyazo.com/079a36199ecd270065742846f1999dce
https://gyazo.com/1ba97d0f1a8990f43b9cc26e85dbdd15
https://gyazo.com/be8d214c38f720c853b5265b8f4f2db9
https://gyazo.com/a3047a3f60f2715a3a94006226226766

Every cavalry regiment was kept intact but reduced by half strength. Most infantry battalions for the Anglo Allies had to be merged and half'd in order to keep scale and proportions correct. Lots of attention was paid to preserve the unit statistics for the Anglo Allied units; only units with similar or exact stats were merged and if the uniforms did not match they were not merged. The French are easier to deal with as almost every division follows the same structure. Artillery was also reduced proportionally but not by quite as much as half; probably closer to 2/5 or 1/4.

Only thing left on the agenda before I try to arrange a test game is to reduce the range of canister, shot, and small arms to fit the new scale. The scenario runs very well but I have not tested it over multiplayer yet but I think it will hold up.

Please comment your thoughts, interest, or lack thereof.

I'll get some screen shots up of what d'Elron's attack looks like before I head off.

Gifs of d'Elron's advance

https://gyazo.com/dc516a50c7009901b9766c3d36cf27f2
https://gyazo.com/6da87955658fe10b91bc90de31b7b600
https://gyazo.com/4ced58787e4e297f44fd57f37bda8525
https://gyazo.com/53380a15b5824af05ec6e35c181d0703
https://gyazo.com/4a5da72dab5741cb2cde04240872f268

P.S. Yes I know the sunken road is not very sunken right now I will fix it later.

Special thanks to Kevin for being my only source of help at this point.

Steam contact:
http://steamcommunity.com/profiles/76561198014028214/

Hi Mr Doran,

I thought I'd just mention that you ought to probably check the topography of the battlefield between the central crossroads of the Charleroi and Wavre roads and the allied left.  

Whilst SOWWL refers to its scenario in this area as 'The Sunken Road' my own research suggests that the road was not in fact sunken for the majority of its length.  My own research suggests that after emerging from the deep cuttings that all four roads went through to meet at the crossroads the road to Wavre followed a path along the exposed face of the ridge and as was typical of farm tracks of this period it was levelled to allow heavily laden farm carts to navigate it without risk of overturning on the slope.  

This meant that whilst the northern side of the road (towards the French) was relatively flat except for normal wear and tear, the northern side (the allied side) was banked quite steeply where the road had been cut into the slope of the ridge to keep it level (the height being dependent upon the steepness of the slope).  The hedges on the northern side lined the top of the bank, presumably to prevent soil erosion or snow drifting down the bank onto the road.  Primary accounts record that D'Erlons columns had reached this road and were in the process of climbing the bank on the far side and forcing their way through the hedge at the top when the Union Brigade attacked.  Hence, they did not see the cavalry coming due to the bank and hedge and were taken completely by surprise, as indeed were the cavalry who on approaching the hedge down the slope urged their horses to leap over it without realising that there was a significant drop to the road beyond which was also full of French infantry.  One French officer reports that he was in the process of urging his men up the bank when suddenly enemy cavalry literally lept into their midst landing amongst them and creating complete panic.

Another significant feature missing from the SOWWL map is the small hill which peaked at 150' (25' higher than the surrounding ridge) just behind the road about halfway along its journey across the ridge.  Here it seems that the road builders did create a short cutting to try and keep the road level as it cut through the rising ground of the hills northern flank.

Finally, the other feature I've read about but not been able to find on any maps (not even Siborne's) is mentioned in passing by both Vivian and Vandeleur in their dispute over who was to blame for not supporting the Union Brigade, is 'The Shambles' which according to them was an large area of cultivated ground dotted with numerous huts, fences and other obstructions that delayed the movement of their cavalry to assist Ponsonby's Brigade.  Both accused the other of dithering and taking too long to navigate this obstacle, but so far I've not found any other evidence of its existence.  

Based upon the location of Vivian and Vandeleur's cavalry at the time and the location of Jacquinots Lancers that they were trying to intercept it must have been somewhere between the small hill and the junction with the road to Smohain. Possibly some sort of overspill from Pappelotte, and perhaps an area of smallholdings used by local farm labourers (like modern day allotments) which would explain all the fences and huts mentioned.  But so, far the only evidence I've seen has been in the letters arguing about whose fault it was that it took so long to cross.

You will also want to slow the marching/running speeds appropriately, along with the all the arty and musket ranges. Secondary would be the speed bonus/mallus set in some of the formations and terrain.

Hi, you may already be aware of this map, which in any event predates Waterloo by some some 40 years, but just in case here is a link: http://mapire.eu/en/map/belgium/?layers=osm%2C87&bbox=486269.7633378614%2C6563551.389819989%2C495442.20673208253%2C6567721.9851758

You seem to be quite the scholar on Waterloo Didz so I have a question for you. Where do you think the grand battery was really placed during the initial bombardment of the Allied left. The vanilla game depicts it pretty close up to LHS but sources vary the placement. If I reduce the ranges of the artillery from their present values by half the closer position to LHS would be the only place where six pound cannon could hit the lines from.

Thank you for the map Petrus. The map may come in handy if I ever try to create a map that has Quatre Bra and Waterloo on a single map. If I can use some of the 10x10 maps I could potentially fit Wavre or Ligny with the QB and Waterloo as well.

I'm not sure I qualify as a scholar on Waterloo, but I have spent most of my adult life piecing together various aspects of the battle to try and unravel the truth from all the myth's and propaganda that have been created about it.

As far as your question regarding the grand battery is concerned I would first have to qualify my answer by saying that in my opinion there was no grand battery at Waterloo.  I think a lot of historians refer to the grand battery as a lazy way of identifying the batteries assigned to the pre-attack bombardment of the Allied positions.  

The tactical concept of the grand battery was simply that, a tactical concept not a physical thing.  The idea being that every French Corps had at it's disposal a number of heavy field batteries (8pdr and 12 pdr guns) which would when circumstances dictated be combined to provide a pre-assault bombardment of the enemy positions.  Which batteries were so deployed and how long they remained in that role was a tactical decision pf the commanders not an organisational imperative, although generally 12 pdr batteries remained in that role longer than the 8 pdrs which were frequently ordered forward to provide closer support once the assault was underway.

As far as the placement of these batteries was concerned on the French right, I'm inclined to accept the view shown on Geocart Map 71 which I bought when I visited the battlefield.  This certainly seems to show the deployment of D'Erlons Divisions more accurately than most British maps with Alix (Quiot) on the corps left, which is where I believe he was in order that his divisions light infantry regiments were readily available to provide a screen for the corps left flank and to invest La Haye Sainte.  Certainly the 13e Legere features heavily in the fighting on that flank and so it seems reasonable to assume that the division was on that flank specifically for that purpose rather than in the centre where they are often shown.

The same map shows the batteries of D'Erlons Corps ranged in an arc about 100-150 metres north of the road between La Belle Alliance and Papelote.  The ground along this road peaks at about 130 metres close to vers Genappe (La belle alliance) and then gradually falls away to around 105 metres as it approaches Chapel St.Roch (Papelotte).

That battery placement for the French was a problem is apparent from the topography and from the journals of the artillery officer responsible to choosing the positions of the guns.  For at least half the distance from the vers Genappe the line of fire towards the Allied ridge was masked by a secondary ridge (or rise) of ground which reaches 125 metres just 400-500 metres from the road.  This secondary ridge was at least 10 metres higher than the location of La Haye Sainte and effectively masked all direct fire on it , or anything between it and the Allied ridge.  

More importantly it was almost exactly at the distance that shots from the French batteries would make their 1st graze in their passage towards the allied line, and even more annoying the 2nd graze would have dropped out of sight beyond it to hit the foot of the Allied ridge meaning that French gun captains first of all had the difficult choice of trying to elevate their guns to fire over it, which would have shortened their range significantly, and secondly they couldn't actually see the fall of their shot beyond it.

Ideally the French would have liked to place their guns on this secondary ridge thus avoiding the problem, but as I mentioned earlier the officer sent to place the gun markers on that ridge found himself under rifle fire from the orchard of La Haye Sainte and abandoned the idea.  I think i'm right in saying that one gun tried to come up but that it's gun team were felled by rifle fire before they could even get into position, and the whole thing was abandoned until after the assault had started.  In fact, I'm pretty certain that it was these guns trying to finally get into position on the secondary ridge which were overrun by Union brigade during the British cavalry attack, as why else would they have found French guns still with their limber teams in close attendance so long after the start of the battle.

Further along the road between La Belle Alliance and Papelotte the secondary ridge drops away and so from about 800 metres along the gun line in front of D'Elons Corps there was a clear line of sight right across the valley to the Allied ridge.  Unfortunately, the height of the French ridge has also dropped as stated earlier and now although the French gun captains can see their targets across the valley their guns are now at least 5-10 metres lower than the targets they are firing at.  More importantly the ground in between drops away by at least 10 metres before climbing again towards the Allied position which means once again that French gun captains were left with a hobson's choice of firing a zero elevation and having their shot drop to the floor of the valley 500 metres below and then try to bounce them up the opposite slope, or to add elevation and try to lob their shot across the valley floor where it would hit the front face of the Allied ridge at a less than opportune angle and probably bury itself.  The difficulties they faced are probably best evidenced by the fact that Bylandts Brigade were able to stand their ground on the forward slope of the Allied ridge with sustainable casualties until the French assault drove them off.

So, all in all the French artillery supporting D'Erlons assault were not in an ideal situation.  The individual guns themselves would have been placed carefully in the best locations their officers could find, so some guns might have had better firing lines than others but generally speaking most of the guns on the French right were at a disadvantage at least until they were able to move forward after the initial bombardment.

By comparison the Allied guns had much better lines of fire, particularly on the extreme left where the height of the Allied ridge gave them a clear line of fire on any French columns crossing the valley below.  Their fire in the centre would have been masked by the same secondary ridge that masked the French guns but two guns from Rosses battery RHA were positioned just above La Haye Sainte where they were intended to provide close support for the defenders of the farm and protect the road from any French attack towards the crossroads.  Unfortunately, these two guns were overrun by Crabbe's Cuirassiers very early in the action which effectively meant that the battle around La Haie Sainte was remarkably without effective artillery support from either side for the entire battle.

P.S. It's almost impossible to determine what choices the French gun captains made about elevation during the opening bombardment but my personal belief is that most chose to elevate their pieces to try and skip their shot across the valley floor and as high up the opposite slope as they could. This seems to tie in with the Allied reports of shot bouncing over head height on the 2nd and 3rd graze, and that the British cavalry were able to avoid most of its effects simply by dismounting and standing beside their horses.

Two battle maps of the period place the French Grand Batterie on the 'intermediary ridge' just above La Haye Sainte. But other sources of the time indicate the further-back 'La Belle Alliance Track' ridge/heights


1) The map of Siborne; while surveying the battlefield in the early 1830s, he spent 8 months lodged at La Haye Sainte ; doing research for his Waterloo projects.
>

2) The map of Waterloo veteran and subsequent tour guide, Sgt.Maj. Cotton


French cannon round-shots were hitting the Mont St.Jean farmhouse in the rear of Wellington's line - this was only possible if the French cannons were located in the ridge near La Haye Sainte; impossibly out of range if they were further back at the La Belle Alliance track.


As well, La Haye Sainte sat in the low ground of the valley; though the garrison riflemen could pot shot up at the intermediary ridge crest line, they had no view beyond that crest line.
All the French gunners had to do was set up a dozen or so yards back from the crest line to be invisible from view from the lower ground..
That being said, the garrison lost possession of the orchard anyway, by early afternoon.
--------------

The La Belle Alliance track position sources are;

1) Craan's map

and
2)
Among the in-depth series of books of collections of waterloo veteran stories - by Gareth Glover, a Hanoverian battery commander - Braun, whose gun position was within a mile of the Grand Batterie; He drew a basic map of the sector - for Siborne's research - that he was in, which included the Grand Batterie position.

The French 6 and 12 pounder guns at Waterloo, had to be firing with their barrels at maximum elevation ( a few degrees up). This way they achieved the maximum range of their roundshots and shells; to hit un-observable targets of the Allied army hidden behind Mont St Jean's higher slopes. The barrage of the Grand Batterie position was as area-fire/ indirect fire method. Bouncing shots of zero degree elevation or 1-2 degree elevation was not possible.

merlendaze wrote:Two battle maps of the period place the French Grand Batterie on the 'intermediary ridge' just above La Haye Sainte. But other sources of the time indicate the further-back 'La Belle Alliance Track' ridge/heights

One has to recognise that a lot of the maps provided for this battle are wrong, particularly those produced by British historians. The topography is usually simplified and the French units tend to be placed where the British thought they must have been rather than where they actually were. The place of the French batteries is a case in point. We know from the journal of the French officer responsible for deciding on the placement of d'Erlons batteries that the ones adjacent to La Haie Sainte could not be placed on the ridge overlooking the farm. De Sales tells us that he had wanted to do so, but that on trying to place the wheel markers for the guns he came under short-range musketry fire from riflemen lining the northern hedge of the farm's orchard less than 50 paces away and was forced to retire. A second attempt to bring up a battery to the crest of the ridge nearby resulted in a similar response that dropped a number of limber horses before they could even unlimber their peices and the attempt had to be abandoned and the batteries deployed on the main ridge further back. This was actually the reason that French artillery could not be brought to bear on the farm during the pre-bombardment.

French cannon round-shots were hitting the Mont St.Jean farmhouse in the rear of Wellington's lin wrote:French cannon round-shots were hitting the Mont St.Jean farmhouse in the rear of Wellington's line

That is perfectly plausible given that a shot from a 6pdr canon is capable of travelling up to 1,200 yards based upon range tests conducted at the time. But even more so if one believes both the French and German accounts of the battle which confirm that French batteries provided close support to D'Erlon's assault and that at least one made it as far as the crossroads on the Allied ridge where is destroyed a German square.

The French 6 and 12 pounder guns at Waterloo, had to be firing with their barrels at maximum elevation ( a few degrees up). This way they achieved the maximum range of their roundshots and shells; to hit un-observable targets of the Allied army hidden behind Mont St Jean's higher slopes. The barrage of the Grand Batterie position was as area-fire/ indirect fire method. Bouncing shots of zero degree elevation or 1-2 degree elevation was not possible. wrote:The French 6 and 12 pounder guns at Waterloo, had to be firing with their barrels at maximum elevation ( a few degrees up). This way they achieved the maximum range of their roundshots and shells; to hit un-observable targets of the Allied army hidden behind Mont St Jean's higher slopes. The barrage of the Grand Batterie position was as area-fire/ indirect fire method. Bouncing shots of zero degree elevation or 1-2 degree elevation was not possible.

This is a slight misunderstanding of how elevation affects the fall of shot. Elevation did not increase the range of shot fall as it might do with modern artillery peices, in fact, it shortens the range mainly as a result of increase the angle of impact with the ground during the grazes. The main reason the French would have been forced to use a small elevation to their fire would have been to try and adjust the point at which their shot made it's first grazing to reduce the impact of the intermediate ridge. At 0' elevation this first graze occurs at around 400 paces from the muzzle, increasing the elevation may have allowed the shot to clear the intermediate ridge and thuse strike the front face of the allied ridge without losing too much energy. However, it would have resulted in the shot being non-lethal for the first 600 paces of its travel.

That being said, the garrison lost possession of the orchard anyway, by early afternoon. wrote:

Yes! There is some evidence that De Sale tried to move the central battery forward to the crest of the intermediary ridge soon after D'Erlons light infantry cleared the German riflemen out of the orchard. Unfortunately, it seems this effort probably coincided with the attack by the Union and Household Cavalry who caught these guns during the act of deploying and cut them to ribbons. It's the only logical explanation as to why when the British attacked the guns they were still attached to their limbers and so many of the boy soldiers who were acting as unarmed limber drivers were killed in the fighting. Eyewitnesses said that unlike the gunners who were able to escape the sword of the British dragoons the limber boys were unable to move because their limbers were still attached to the guns and being unarmed were cut down where they sat.

Didz wrote:  Didz on Sat Feb 27, 2021 1:46 am
.........One has to recognise that a lot of the maps provided for this battle are wrong, particularly those produced by British historians. The topography is usually simplified and the French units tend to be placed where the British thought they must have been rather than where they actually were. The place of the French batteries is a case in point. We know from the journal of the French officer responsible for deciding on the placement of d'Erlons batteries that the ones adjacent to La Haie Sainte could not be placed on the ridge overlooking the farm. De Sales tells us that he had wanted to do so, but that on trying to place the wheel markers for the guns he came under short-range musketry fire from riflemen lining the northern hedge of the farm's orchard less than 50 paces away and was forced to retire. A second attempt to bring up a battery to the crest of the ridge nearby resulted in a similar response that dropped a number of limber horses before they could even unlimber their peices and the attempt had to be abandoned and the batteries deployed on the main ridge further back. This was actually the reason that French artillery could not be brought to bear on the farm during the pre-bombardment.

You replied unexpectedly fast; here's my belated follow-up anyway.

- Regarding my 2 sources who referred to the intermediary ridge as the Grand Batterie placement on their maps; Siborne of course, was set up at LHS farm for many months, and interviewed many battle participants - and Cotton was a soldier in the battle before he did his Waterloo battlefield tour guide stint.
- Yes, to a point, I do agree with the Desales version, which I've  read also. The LHS orchard was permanently lost by 2 pm, and the French had the garrison mostly confined until its loss in the evening. There is some debate on how many guns were in the initial set-up, but my theory is that most likely by 3 pm, the grand battery was free to set-up on the intermediary ridge.... well out of range of any KGL snipers that may have been in the LHS top floor windows.
- I believe Napoleon's specific orders for the Grand Battery was to focus on the Allied ridge. He made no mention of pummeling LHS.
- The heights of the French ridge in front of LHS orchard was quite high - higher than the intermediary ridge, while LHS was situated even lower; The French guns in that area would need only fall back a bit from the crest line to be invisible from the LHS defenders.

 a shot from a 6pdr canon is capable of traveling up to 1,200 yards based upon range tests conducted at the time. But even more so if one believes both the French and German accounts of the battle which confirm that French batteries provided close support to D'Erlon's assault and that at least one made it as far as the crossroads on the Allied ridge where is destroyed a German square.

My point exactly; the Mont St.Jean Farmhouse could only be in the extreme range of French 12 pdrs from the intermediary ridge, and out of range of 6 pdrs maximum range. From the LBA track, not even French 12 pdrs could have touched the MSJ farm. Also - Allied ammo wagons were getting hit and blown up; their position was in line with the MSJ farmhouse range; physically too impossible to hit from the LBA track line - even by French 12 pdrs.
One interesting event in the battle's 'crisis' phase, involved a Nassau company making a mad dash for a french gun that had ventured near the crossroads. Wellington tried in vain to have the bold move stopped, but they had gone too far and were run down by French cavalry waiting in ambush.

This is a slight misunderstanding of how elevation affects the fall of shot. Elevation did not increase the range of shot fall as it might do with modern artillery peices, in fact, it shortens the range mainly as a result of increase the angle of impact with the ground during the grazes.

Actually, not at all. This is exactly how elevation works when Napoleonic guns were fired. Gravity corresponding with range. Guns firing roundshot at 0 degrees theoretically can do the most damage as the shot ploughs through man size targets in the way. If no targets were hit, gravity pulls down the shot to the 'effective range' limit. Elevating the barrel from half a degree to 2 degrees, will increase the maximum range. At the highest barrel elevation, the roundshot is lobbing over everyone's heads along the way, until the very end of its drop at max'ed range. Firing between half a degree and one degree goes over some heads at the start of the shot, but it has enough power when it lands to do the destructive bounce impacts, further than effective range, but not nearly as far as maximum range; a half degree elevation produces more 'bounce' destruction, than a higher-shot one degree elevation.

Yes! There is some evidence that De Sale tried to move the central battery forward to the crest of the intermediary ridge soon after D'Erlons light infantry cleared the German riflemen out of the orchard. Unfortunately, it seems this effort probably coincided with the attack by the Union and Household Cavalry who caught these guns during the act of deploying and cut them to ribbons. .......

Yes, some French guns were moving up with the attack and got caught in the valley. You can imagine what power they would have wrought had they made it up to the Ohain road line. It's mysterious why none were moved up during the French cavalry attacks..... yet, they moved up after the fall of LHS, and during the Middle Guard attacks.

I'll try keep up with your Waterloo and Napoleon posts; good discussions!  

I rely upon Sibourne for a lot of my primary information as he did gather the largest collection of primary evidence available for the battle.  Unfortunately, not for want of trying he was unable to obtain any primary evidence from the French and so much of his testimony is one-sided and consequently difficult to verify.  The good news is that as time has passed more and more foreign historians have begun to discover the letters and journals of French and other foreign officers and soldiers who were present at the battle and this has given us a much more accurate, balanced and plausible view of what actually transpired.

I'm afraid, IF Napoleon specifically told his artillery not to provide any support for the assault on LHS then such a stupid order has been lost to history.  DeSales journal tells us exactly what his orders were and how he had hoped to fulfil them and why in the case of LHS he initially couldn't.

As for the heights of the respective ridges, I would respectfully suggest that you conduct some elevation cross-sections of the battlefield based upon the topographical maps of the period and check your facts.  For example, GeoCart 71 shows the height of the intermediary ridge above LHS to be between 130-135 M at the times of the battle, whilst the guns on the main ridge behind it are shown deployed just above the 130M contour 400M behind the intermediary ridge.  It doesn't take a genius therefore to work out that Napoleon's gunners on this section of the lines would not have been able to see LHS in the depression beyond the intermediary ridge as the farm was a full 20' lower than the crest of the intervening ridge.

More importantly, based on Muller Tests the fire from the guns behind this intervening ridge would have had to be elevated to avoid grazing the high ground to their front and that would have meant that the first graze of their shot would have been extended beyond the usual 400 yards to around 650-750 yards.  The shots not becoming lethal until they struck the front face of the allied ridge just beyond the farm and began ricocheting up the ridges front face. This seems to be confirmed by accounts from troops in this area who record the French shot either bounding up the ridge in high arcs or simply rolling along the ground. This was the reason LHS was NOT subject to the normal pre-bombardment by DeSales guns and why once the orchard had been cleared he tried to bring his guns forward to the intermediary ridge where they were caught still limbered by the Union and Household Brigades.

As far as  Mont St.Jean Farmhouse is concerned, it was not visible to the French Gunners until they made it to the top of the Allied ridge and even then my understanding was that it was never prepared as a strongpoint and was actually in use as a hospital during the battle being well behind the lines.

Your story about the Nassau company sounds partly plausible.  The French certainly moved their artillery forward to support D'Erlons assault and there are other primary accounts of French guns reaching the Allied ridge close to the crossroads.  I can also believe that faced with the sight of a French artillery piece being deployed within canister range of your square some enterprising officers might have decided to throw caution to the wind and try to rush it before it could destroy them. The Dutch officers seem to have a particular tendency towards this sort of dash and elan, the 5th National Militia even charging Fench cavalry with the bayonet at Quatre Bras the day before. Quite honestly it's a bit of a Hobson's choice whether to stand there in square and wait to get killed by canister fire or to risk rushing the gun  (some of which were said to be within 50 paces of their targets) and face the swords of the hovering cavalry.

What is less plausible is that Wellington had any involvement in the matter.  The central sector of the Allied ridge was commanded by the Prince of Orange and there is no documentary evidence that Wellington even took an interest in what was happening in this sector.  By this time in the battle, it appears that Wellington was entirely engrossed in events beyond the high spur in the sector overlooking Hougoumont.  In fact, he was probably trapped in a square by French cavalry like most other Allied Field officers at this time.  He certainly seemed to be oblivious of events in his centre and never ever mentioned the fact that the French had seized the central crossroads or that they were blasting German and Dutch squares at close range with their artillery.  Given that this was the real crisis of the battle one would have expected Wellington to have mentioned it in his report and given the Prince of Orange the proper credit for fending it off long enough for the Prussians to arrive.  But he doesn't, suggesting to me that he actually didn't know it was happening.

merlendaze wrote: It's mysterious why none were moved up during the French cavalry attacks..... yet, they moved up after the fall of LHS, and during the Middle Guard attacks.

Actually, it's not mysterious at all because that's exactly what happened.  There is plenty of primary evidence that confirms that French cavalry and artillery were operating together to reduce the Allied squares in the centre of the Allied line.  You even quoted one analogy yourself a few minutes ago.  The only reason it doesn't get mentioned in the British histories is that Wellington never knew it was happening and so never mentioned it in his official report.  

The only problem that the French had in the Allied centre was that Napoleon was sulking and more worried about his stomach than winning the battle at the time of the breakthrough and instead of supporting it which would have won him the battle he chose to send Ney a dumb-arse response to his request for more infantry.

In the end, the Allied centre was saved by the Prince of Orange, Napoleon's stomach, the fact that most of D'Erlon's infantry had run out of ammunition and the timely arrival of Zeitens Prussians.

You're prompt again with follow-ups.
Yes, it was just a matter of time for the other armies sources to get translated and shared; they were waiting to be found.

As for Napoleon's 'battery orders: according to Andrew Fields 'French Perspectives' book, in the Grand Battery chapter......
Napoleon's orders for the Divisional reserve 12pdr batteries of the I, II, VI Corps in the Grand Battery;
"These 24 guns are to fire on the troops at Mont Saint Jean [Hill], and Count D'Erlon is to commence the attack... "
Napoleon's strategy implies D'Erlon's prime target was capturing the Ohain Heights, troops were the bombarment targets -LHS was not to be trifled with in being pounded for hours. In my view it should have been stormed first though.

Over the decades, I've seen many many Waterloo battlefield maps of the period - some unheard ones; and photos, and maps of these current times pertaining to elevation studies, and perused the many battlefield artworks made by Waterloo veterans, and Waterloo battlefield visitors, tourists, and artists, made from days to a couple of years after the battle - Turner's sketches are interesting, I think you'll agree. I've also been keen on visitors of the time who wrote descriptions of the battlefield features.

One description - which I have to find the specific reference for, describes the very deep road cutting along the highway from south of the intermediary ridge going to LBA.
This sunken road reference matches with Craan's 1845 map showing a rise along the road at that specific point.
Rettberg who commanded a Hanoverian battery - posted near Best and Vincke's brigades, made a battle map based on his close view of the French gun position, that shows only one valley in between the Grand Battery and the Allied ridge, and far north of the LBA track/ crest....

In fact, LHS could be seen by Desalle's guns from the intermediary ridge east of the highway, nothing was blocking their view. Napoleon's orders were to fire at the troops across the valley.
From the highway area only being further south of that crestline would block all but the roofs. I'm not sure how tall the orchard trees were. Woods trees are taller than orchard trees.

None of the Allied troops behind Ohain ridge and Mont St.Jean Hill were visible specific targets to the French gunners. The skilled French were using area- wide firing. They knew targets were behind the crests opposite, and landed their area fire in that zone.
From the LBA track theory, their maximum range could not land beyond the crest; bouncing fire lands even less further than maximum range arcs.
From the LBA track, a French 12 pdr could land its maximum shots only onto the crest line; no bounce is possible beyond the maximum range.
Only from the Intermediary ridge could French 6pdr shots land on and just behind the Allied crest, while the 12 pdrs could his as far as MSJ farm with their blind firing; these shots were missing the Union brigade, which was being damaged enough in the pre-attack barrage that the cavalry regiments dismounted and shifted forward a couple of times to get more cover behind the slopes.
I'm not disputing skipping shots on the forward slopes, but the actual physics and science of French gun ranges, makes the LBA track position maximum range limit distance to the Allied crests. 6 pdr max. is 1500 yards > at best, only hitting the Ohain Road and no further, while the French 12 pdr max. is 1800 yards, just north of the Ohain road..... 2 degree gun elevation for maximum fire - nor bouncing with these dropped shots.

Yes, it's quite under-stressed how Wellington's infantry and gunners had to simply stand in line and get sniped at by the dreaded French tiraillerade. They were under strict orders to not budge. What a mental strain to resist running or diving for cover while seeing the enemy 40-50 yards away casually sniping.
I agree with the point about Wellington being mostly on the right flank; if I recall, he personally did give orders one or two times for infantry detachments to drive away French skirmishers.

RE: The French guns that moved up to the center; they did so after the main French cavalry charges, after the fall of LHS. The Nassau incident occurred at that point. French cavalry remained loitering around the center in ambush mode - unfortunately catching Ompteda's battalion advance in line on LHS. These brave French gun crews lasted a while before getting subdued.

Mont St.Jean hill and the Ohain ridge was higher than the intermediary ridge. They could see everything except the reverse slopes; French veteran Martin notes the column he was in, getting some shelter from Allied cannon fire as the column moved into the reverse slope/valley south of the intermediary ridge.

Yes, LHS was incredibly vulnerable to an early massive attack. Only about 400-500 reinforcements arrived there during its fight. But it is an impressive farmhouse - up close it's intimidating, and its only a bit smaller than hougoumont in terms of area size.

I have no dispute about the bouncing fire witnessed. My only statement on the topic is the gun range physics of the French Grand battery placement, which the bounces further prove the intermediate ridge position to make that happen.

The Prince of Orange is rarely mentioned for the crucial actions he made in the campaign; especially on June 15th, and then rallying troops throughout the 18th.

Yes! Napoleon did order the reserve batteries you mention to support D'Erlon's attack with a preparatory bombardment but in doing so he placed all of these guns including those of the French 1st Corps under the overall command of DeSales.  It was his decision and responsibility to determine where they were sited and at what they were aimed.  It was this activity that kept him busy for most of the morning prior to the commencement of the attack and he left quite a detailed account of his activities and how he conducted them.  This is where I picked up the information on the problems he had attempting to site guns on the intermediary ridge.

The cutting you mention is also visible on the Geo-Carte 71 map I mentioned and I also managed to verify its existence by checking several prints of the area drawn before the ridge was destroyed by the Belgians to facilitate the railway line they laid to boost the tourist trade after the battle and assist with the export of the topsoil.

The physic's of artillery fire for the period are well documented and based on actual firing test conducted shortly after the battle on every calibre of gun in use.  The ranges and graze distances for round shot are clearly noted and extremely consistent.  It's unlikely they were any different at Waterloo unless the French were using considerably more inferior powder.

The Allied ridge at the time of the battle (prior to being scraped) is shown as between 125m and 130m being higher towards the west where it rose to join the Nivelles Road, the highest point being the spur midway between LHS and Hougoumont which effectively divided the battlefield into two distinct amphitheatres and became the focus of a constant battle for possession by both sides as the only point close to the battlefront from which one could see everything in both directions.  But as Mercer was quick to point out nothing lived on its crest for long and he was witness to it changing hands multiple times during the day.  It was actually that crest from which a Prussian Horse Artillery Battery fired on him towards the end of the battle causing more destruction in a few minutes than the French had managed over the entire course of the battle. But overall the two ridges were of about comparable height with only thevintermediary ridge and the area to the west of the Charlerio Road being shown as over 130M

Thanks for the follow-up info.
Yes, the MSJ summit protrusion allowed for that unfortunate flanking fire which blasted Mercer.
I wonder what time that event occurred; seems like it could only logically be just after the Middle Guard was driven off the slopes.

It's challenging for me to keep up with your prompt replying.....
That's interesting info you shared, regarding the rail line info; I saw that feature on an LHS postcard of the time, and wondered what purpose it served; it looked like a tram car line to me. Any online source for that bit of history?

I'll pm you at some point soon; seems like we can share a lot of good info, if you like.


On the height of the 'Ohain ridge' east of Brussels; I point to Corporal Dickson of the Greys account - the early section of which refers to his morning scout patrol near the crossroads. He mentioned the 'German troops' unit marching by him in brazenly good spirits - apparently this was the Nassau battalion sent off from Saxe Weimar's brigade to its new position in the Hougoumont defence. Dickson also refers to having a good view of the French troops assembling across the valley; he claimed to see the cuirassiers (Milhaud's corps) over a mile away south of the LBA track. Though the Ohain crest was not as high as the MSJ hill, it did have a good view over the French side, except for the predominant LBA heights. The small hill you mentioned in your earliest thread post also seemed to have a good view of everything around it in that sector where the Hanoverians were posted.

merlendaze wrote:Yes, the MSJ summit protrusion allowed for that unfortunate flanking fire which blasted Mercer.
I wonder what time that event occurred; seems like it could only logically be just after the Middle Guard was driven off the slopes

The accurate timing of events during the battle are understandably hazy due to the general lack of accurate timepieces and the 'Car Crash' syndrome that most eye witnesses were suffering from during the event.  But as you rightly point out it must have been after the 4th Grenadiers square was driven from the crest of the spur as they certainly couldn't have deployed there with the French still in possession of the ground.  If one assumes that the final attack of the guard began at about 7pm and took at least an hour to drive off then it would have been sometime early in the general pursuit.  Makes you wonder what they thought they were firing at, but having visited that area I know it is very disorienting when viewed from the valley floor.

merlendaze wrote:That's interesting info you shared, regarding the rail line info; I saw that feature on an LHS postcard of the time, and wondered what purpose it served; it looked like a tram car line to me. Any online source for that bit of history?

Not much. Like you I discovered the main evidence during my study of the topography of the battlefield as I was trying to confirm the height of the fields on both sides of the Charlerio road prior to the battle and instead found prints showing the various stages of the Belgian exploitation of the battlefield as a tourist trap.  Initial prints show a clear widening of the road to include both a wider flatter carriageway and a bridlepath added alongside it so that more carriages could reach LHS and gentlemen could ride beside the chausee and pause without interrupting the traffic.  Then later on there are prints showing a massive cut back and levelling of the ground beyond the bridlepath which some historians seem to incorrectly attribute to some sort of strange mass burial activity but is actually revealed by later prints to be the preparation of the railbed for a railway (or tram) track.

The Belgians constantly play down or deny the extent to which the battlefield was vandalised after the battle but Wellington for one was not fooled and uttered the famous phrase 'They've ruined my battlefield" when he visited it a few years later. My personal belief is that not only was the Allied ridge scraped to create the Lion Mound but that the railway track was used to scrape and extract most of the topsoil from the entire battlefield where most of the action occurred.  This was actually common practice at the time as topsoil soaked in blood and bone meal was highly prized as a fertiliser particularly in the UK.  My grandfather was still using it on his market garden forty years ago (not from Waterloo obviously).

It would explain why historians have failed miserably to find any evidence of the thousands of corpses that should have been buried on the battlefield, or indeed the charring left by the massive funeral pyres that some witnesses say were used to dispose of the bodies.  We also know for example that the corpses were lotted for anything of commercial value, particularly teeth, the term 'Waterloo Teeth' being used long after the likely supply from the battlefield ran out, and we also know that Belgian battlefield guides were selling human bones and skulls as souvenirs to visitors as some have turned up in collections in the UK.  So, I think it highly likely that the topsoil was sold off to commercial fertiliser companies, which also explains why the battlefield today is so different to the prints of the period.

merlendaze wrote:I point to Corporal Dickson of the Greys account - the early section of which refers to his morning scout patrol near the crossroads. He mentioned the 'German troops' unit marching by him in brazenly good spirits - apparently, this was the Nassau battalion sent off from Saxe Weimar's brigade to its new position in the Hougoumont defence. Dickson also refers to having a good view of the French troops assembling across the valley; he claimed to see the cuirassiers (Milhaud's corps) over a mile away south of the LBA track.

Yes! I've read Dickerson account and as always (particularly with British eyewitness accounts) it is necessary to verify its accuracy.  Where was Dickerson standing when he saw the Cuirassiers? What time was it? How did he know it was Milhaud's Corps? How far away were they when he saw them? How many did he see? What happened just before they appeared?, What happened immediately after they appeared? Who else saw them? What do the French accounts say?

Even assuming that Dickerson is not just spinning a yarn for his mates.  Milhaud's Cavalry were deployed initially on a secondary ridge behind the main French battleline.  The ridge itself as with all the ridges on the field was higher to its western end than its eastern end with Walthier's Brigade shown with it's left flank on the highest ground at 130M and Delort's to its right on the eastern slope at around 120M.  The ridge itself curves around to join the main French ridge where Donzelots Infantry Division was positioned on ground of the same height.  So, for Dickerson to be able to see Milhaud's Cavalry in their initial positions he would have had to be able not only to see though a hill but also have ignored several thopusands of French infantry arrayed in marching columns and the French gun line. Not only that but if he was standing on the Allied Ridge at the time then the French Cavalry would have been 1,440M away, which according to the Field Service Pocket Manual used by British Officers during WW1 means that at best he would have been able to discern the type of troops he was looking at and their approximate numbers but certainly not the details of their uniforms or the identity of their commanders.

My guess is that either Dickerson is confusing this incident with a period much later in the battle when Milhaud's cavalry moved forward to support D'Erlon's assault or more likely he was viewing this from a position well forward of the Allied lines perhaps even from the area around the spur where there is a much clearer line of site towards LBA and would explain why he witnessed the German battalion heading for Hougoumont at about the same time.  This would also suggest he was on picket duty and thus would explain why he was away from his unit.

What we do know for instance is that the troops lining the southern perimeter of LHS orchard had no vision whatsoever of the French beyond the intermediary ridge and having successfully driven off DeSales and his attempt to deploy his guns were eventually surprised and almost overrun by the leading elements of the 13e Legere who suddenly appeared on the crest top not more than 50 paces away.

Ultimately the topography of the battlefield speaks for itself and either Wellington was a genius for choosing it, or he was just damned lucky.

Great post..... filled to the brim with useful details again.

Yes, on Corporal Dickson - and his witness account wrote on his behalf by his audience thereafter, there are far flung oddities/embellishments here and there; if I recall one, where Dickson wrote about 200 French guns opening fire at the start of the battle; obviously not a reference based on reality, but the fact that he only knew the French had over 200 cannons from later sources; and of course most of these guns did not open fire at the battle start.
Certainly about Milhaud's position being obscured south of the LBA track ridge line. May be from the crossroads/ a forward position, it's feasible he could spot them moving up/down to the area in the morning patrol.

Very interesting info on the tramline. Postcards of the time showing LHS yield an interesting host of changes along that stretch of highway in the span of a century.

So sad about the desecration of the soldiers bodies isn't it.

On the battlefield choice; what do you make of Delancey's troop dispositions? Wellington's left seemed too thin; even on the morning of the 18th, Wellington advised the staff of the arriving brigade of Lambert to hold at MSJ village, in preparation for a possible advance to the Ohain ridge area. One can imagine how they may have heavily impacted against D'Erlon's near breakthrough, which Uxbridge achieved anyway though.

merlendaze wrote:Very interesting info on the tramline. Postcards of the time showing LHS yield an interesting host of changes along that stretch of highway in the span of a century.

Yes! I couldn't believe it when I first saw that photograph.  It's not something that ever gets mentioned in official histories or by the Belgian's in their history of managing the battlefield.  But it puts a whole new interpretation on many of the other prints of LHS from the period not least the one supposedly depicting the burial of dead from the battle around LHS along the Charlerio Road.  Not only explaining why there are none but if there were what probably happened to them.

BTW: Look at the heights of the ground beyond the railway cut on the right.

Siborne and many other prints show that the Charleroi Road literally ran in a cutting for most of its path across the valley probably at least 1' below the surface of the surrounding fields and in some places much deeper and it terminated in deep cuttings at both ends where the road had been cut into the ridges to try and easy the strain on the horses using it.  Incidentally, this was the only reason that the 95th's barrier across the road near LHS had any tangible benefit.  If the road was as flat and level as it is today the French would merely have gone around it.  It also explains the struggle that Crabbe's Cuirassiers had trying to avoid the Household cavalry, the drop from the Kitchen Garden down to the road was pretty fierce even Kennedy Clarke mentions it as awkward.  But once on the road the poor sods found themselves trapped in a cutting and being fired upon from all sides.  It was around here that Colonel Crabbe lost his life, a brave Belgian fighting on the wrong side.

Yes, the one civilian account I'm still trying to recall, mentioned the highway cutting being 8' deep just north of LBA.

I agree on the abatis observation; these were real blockers at the 95th sandpit/knoll area you mentioned relating to Crabbe's fate, and at the Nivelles position too which was a death trap also, where at both the embankments were high. The one near the LHS entrance did not last long as an effective blocker.

I came across this while looking up more info on Crabbe; see pm from me on that.....
The coloured engraving by Charles Turner, based at the time, on a George Jones sketch of the battlefield center, showing the cutting north of LBA - and pic below, the view from the crossroads.

https://books.google.com/books?id=iGATDQAAQBAJ&pg=PT315&lpg=PT315&dq=Jean-Louis+de+Crabb%C3%A9,+battle+waterloo&source=bl&ots=wKwzYrvR5i&sig=ACfU3U0RZHXATV-b4HmuyuORPSaKZpTSvQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiXgZvo4cvvAhU7STABHWX9A0U4ChDoATAFegQIBhAD#v=onepage&q=Jean-Louis%20de%20Crabb%C3%A9%2C%20battle%20waterloo&f=false

and

https://image.invaluable.com/housePhotos/Nicholson/02/674802/H0804-L212270313_original.jpg

Barnard seems to suggest in his notes that the copse pictured on the left of the road overlooking the gravel pit and cutting was somewhat thicker at the time of the battle and at least offered decent cover for his riflemen posted there. I certainly got the impression from his description that it contained more than two straggly trees and a few bushes and he says it took some effort later in the battle to extract it from the hands of the French skirmishers who had taken up residence.

We should assume your Barnard source is correct.
With regards to some of these battlefield prints and paintings, some such scenes are later done by artists 'back home', based on sketches of the artists who were actually on the scene making original sketches. As such, the secondary pictures have some artistic-license embellishments ( extra bushes/trees etc ) or missing details, or fantasy horizon backdrops. all of which deviate from reality in some way. The Charles Turner example is interesting; I just noticed the walking path to the left of the highway.

merlendaze wrote: I just noticed the walking path to the left of the highway.

Yes! Noticed that too. It seems unlikely that path would have existed at the time of the battle as it really serves no purpose other than to give access to the view from the top of the heights over the sandpit and the valley. To me, it looks like a path created by tourists visiting the spot after the battle, which probably also explains the lack of trees as many would have been destroyed by artillery fire. Does the image have a date?

I can try find the date.
From my experience in the antique prints industry, I'll assume from the art style (and the type of print, and hand-colouring/ watercolour wash on the black and white print), this scene is around the 1820s - 1830s period.

Went back to the picture's site, and can't find the source page

Similar style prints - dated 1816
https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/P_1873-0510-1435-1436

Here's the series list of the Mudford publishings of post-battle scenes; in collaboration with 3 artists for this series of originals and engravings.
One of the artists, Rouse/Rowse, did get sent on an official picture/making mission of the area. Cruikshank was a famous print cartoonist of the period.
https://ageofrevolution.org/200-object/william-mudford-historical-account-campaign-netherlands/

the actual antique book reference
http://bibliotheque-martial-lapeyre.napoleon.org/Default/doc/SYRACUSE/71714/an-historical-account-of-the-campaign-in-the-netherlands-in-1815-under-his-grace-the-duke-of-welling?collection=FNAP_MUDFORD_1815

Interesting;
https://www.the-saleroom.com/en-gb/auction-catalogues/trs-auctions/catalogue-id-thomso10174/lot-17900e22-606b-4902-a945-acde00f5a5fa

In my search I also found this; portrait of a younger Picton
https://www.invaluable.com/auction-lot/portrait-of-british-general-sir-thomas-picton-ant-7-c-e4d46258a6

It's interesting, isn't it?

In almost all of these prints, one can see that the roads are significantly below the level of the fields on either side of it, and yet they are not anymore even though the roads are still level with the buildings built alongside them. So, logically this must imply that the road bed has not been raised but rather that the field levels have been lowered hence my belief that the battlefield was scraped for fertiliser.

Yes - field and soil erosion is another interesting topic to look into, by nature and human impact.

We have pictorial evidence of the reason the field levels were lowered and graded along the path of the Charleroi road that was clearly to allow the laying of the railway track across the battlefield.  Then there was the scraping done to build the Lion Mound although the Belgian authorities insist that was soil was scraped from the reverse slope of the Allied ridge.  The rest could indeed be soil or agricultural erosion but if so it wouldn't explain why the soil itself is not constantly leeching battlefield debris similar to that which farmers along the Somme valley and other old battlefield sites have to cope with.  It is the absence of battlefield debris both human, animal and inanimate that leads me to conclude that the stories of the battlefield being scraped by fertiliser contractors are true and that the railway track was simply part of that process to carry away the valuable topsoil. One skeleton does not signify a major battlefield site and I also watched with interest the Waterloo Projects attempt to find the alleged burial pit for the defenders of Hougoumont, supposedly inside a barn which was subsequently collapsed for no apparent reason. But there were no human remains either within or close to the farm, so where did they bury the French dead?